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Balancing Bank Overexposure and Credit
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Marc R. Cohent
Self-discipline is necessary; so, too, is mutual accommodation ...
Lenders and borrowers must remember that each has an enormous stake
in the other's success.
-President Ronald Reagan, Dec. 1, 1982,
Toast to President Joao Baptista Fi-
gueiredo of Brazil'
The relationship that now exists between commercial banks and less
developed countries (LDCs)2 threatens the stability of the international
financial and U.S. banking systems. Many LDCs are experiencing se-
vere problems in servicing their massive debts to the commercial banks,
while at the same time the number of banks willing to continue lending
to these LDCs and the amount of new credit these banks are willing to
extend both are decreasing. In a rare display of unanimity, private and
central bankers, government officials from LDCs and developed coun-
tries (DCs), multilateral financial institutions, and even the mass media
have acknowledged the dangers presented by these mutually reinforc-
ing phenomena. 3 Responsibility for the gravity of the present situation
has been attributed to selfish aims on the part of DCs, mismanagement
by LDCs, and imprudence on the part of banks.4 Assigning blame,
however, is useful only insofar as it helps avert future crises; the impor-
tant task today is "to prevent a bad situation from becoming a global
disaster."5
After outlining the nature and scope of the present crisis, this Article
sets forth the general objectives of U.S. regulation of foreign lending by
t J.D. candidate, Yale University.
1. 18 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1556-57 (Dec. 13, 1982).
2. The term "LDC" is used in this Article to refer to the underdeveloped countries of the
Third World, Eastern Europe, and OPEC which have borrowed extensively from Western
commercial banks.
3. See Egan, Banks on the Brink, NEw YORK, Oct. 25, 1982, at 28, 28-31; Mayer,
Banker's Risk in Special Pleading, FINANCIER, Nov. 1982, at 47; Dizard, The End of Let's
Pretend, FORTUNE, Nov. 29, 1982, at 60-78.
4. Egan, supra note 3, at 31.
5. 1d.
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domestic commercial banks. It then describes the existing regulatory
framework and critically analyzes its failure to promote the achieve-
ment of these objectives. In conclusion, the Article proposes the estab-
lishment of a system of country exposure limits and loan insurance that
would better serve U.S. policy goals, while reducing the possibility of a
financial catastrophe.6
I. The Crisis in U.S. Commercial Bank Lending to LDCs
The origins of the present crisis can be traced to the massive transfer
of financial capital from commercial banks to LDCs that took place
throughout the 1970's. 7 Because bank lending afforded greater flex-
ibility and political and economic independence, as well as lower costs,
the LDCs found borrowing from private banks more appealing than
relying on the more conventional public and private sources of foreign
capital.8 For their part, the banks, flush with newly created OPEC de-
posits and faced with stagnant domestic loan demand, were eager to
enter the lucrative and then glamorous foreign lending market.9 The
upsurge in bank-LDC lending--often called recycling 10-that resulted
from this confluence of interests initially was dominated by the large
6. Although the present regulatory framework applies equally to lending to LDCs or to
other countries, this Article addresses the deficiencies in the framework with respect to lend-
ing to LDCs. The reform proposals made herein apply solely to that lending.
The Article focuses on U.S. regulation because of the central role of U.S. banks in LDC
lending, and because no international solution to the present financial crisis seems likely.
Because the problem has received a great deal of attention in the U.S., it is likely that some
reform package will be adopted. In conjunction with the Reagan Administration's request
for an increase in the U.S. contribution to the International Monetary Fund, Congress is
presently considering a number of initiatives relating to the situation. See infra note 188; see
generally No Time for Rancor Against the Banks, N.Y. Times, Apr. 1, 1983, at A26, col. 1
(editorial). If the U.S. successfully can address the problem, other developed countries may
choose to adopt similar measures in relation to their banks' international lending.
Although the current recession has exacerbated greatly the debt crisis, even a full world-
wide recovery would not obviate the need to address basic problems underlying LDC
lending.
7. The LDCs borrowed to sustain development and imports as they experienced balance
of payments deficits caused by large increases in petroleum prices, worldwide recessions,
and plunging prices for LDC exports. The Debt-Bomb Threat, TIME, Jan. 10, 1983, at 42,
45-46.
8. See DaCosta, How Bank Lending Helps LDCs, BANKER (London), Oct. 1980, at 47,
49; P. WELLONs, BORROWING BY DEVELOPING COUNTRIES ON THE EUROCURRENCY MAR-
KET 46 (1977); STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 95TH CONG., 1ST SESS.,
INTERNATIONAL DEBT, THE BANKS AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 16-17 (Comm. Print 1977)
(prepared by Karin Lissakers for the Subcomm. on Foreign Economic Policy) [hereinafter
STAFF REPORT]; Griffith-Jones, The Growth ofMultinational Banking, the Eurocurrency Mar-
ket and their Effects on Developing Countries, 16 J. DE. STUD. 204, 207-09 (1980).
9. STAFF REPORT, supra note 8, at 43, 46; The Debt-Bomb Threat, supra note 7, at 45; see
Egan, supra note 3, at 30.
10. So called because banks circulate OPEC deposits to deficit-plagued LDCs, which in
turn return much of the money to the OPEC countries as they pay their petroleum debts.
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U.S. "money-center" banks, 1 but U.S. regional banks, as well as for-
eign banks, subsequently became more deeply involved.' 2
The most significant aspect of the banks' novel recycling role is that
they have assumed country risk in addition to the normal credit risk
which accompanies all loans. Country risk encompasses the economic,
social, political, and legal factors that accompany lending to foreign
sovereigns or to foreign economic entities whose payment ability may
be affected by the actions of foreign states. 13 It thus includes the risk of
"political or social upheaval, nationalization or appropriation, govern-
ment repudiation of external debts, exchange controls, or foreign ex-
change shortfalls,"'14 and has significant influence on the risk of lending
to economic entities within a given country.'5 The assumption of coun-
try risk in loans to LDC borrowers, whether sovereign or private enti-
ties, has added a new and potentially dangerous dimension to the
banks' exposure.
As U.S. bank lending to LDCs has increased, banks' exposure to
LDCs in relation to their capital 16 has generated substantial concern. 7
The Debt-Bomb Threat, supra note 7, at 45; Egan, supra note 3, at 30; STAFF REPORT, supra
note 8, at 43, 46.
11. STAFF REPORT, supra note 8, at 9; The Debt-Bomb Threat, supra note 7, at 45-46;
Egan, supra note 3, at 30.
.12. The Debt-Bomb Threat, supra note 7, at 45-46; Egan, supra note 3, at 30.
13. A New Supervisory Approach to Foreign Lending, FED. RES. BANK N.Y.Q. REV.,
Spring 1978, at 1, 2.
14. Id
15. Eichler, Country Risk Analsis and Bank Lending to Eastern Europe, in EASTERN
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT, PART 2: REGIONAL ASSESSMENTS: A COMPENDIUM OF
PAPERS SUBMITTED TO THE JOINT ECONOMIC COMM., 97TH CONO., 1ST SESs. 761 (Comm.
Print 1981). The same commentator noted that country risk "is concerned with the willing-
ness and the ability of the central bank to furnish a borrower with convertible currency."
Id.
A useful distinction between country risk and credit risk is that the latter is the particular
financial risk inherent in each economic entity within an LDC, while the former represents
the general possibility of a breakdown in a country's finances of sufficient magnitude to
threaten repayment of the loans of all entities located in the country.
A small proportion of bank loans to LDCs are guaranteed by governments or entities
outside the LDC. In these cases, the country risk borne by the bank is that of the guarantor
country. A New Supervisory Approach to Foreign Lending, supra note 13, at 6.
16. The ratio of outstanding loans to capital is a crucial measure of bank exposure, be-
cause capital is depleted when loans are written off as losses, with the result that the lending
bank becomes less solvent. See Top Banks' Third World Loans Detailed, N.Y. Times, Mar.
18, 1983, at D3, col. 1. For purposes of analyzing loan exposure, a bank's capital usually is
taken to be shareholders' equity plus retained earnings and loss reserves. A Roundup of
Fourth Quarter Bank Results, N.Y. Times, Jan. 15, 1983, at DI, col. 3. The Comptroller of
the Currency regulations which limit U.S. bank lending to individual foreign public sector
borrowers to a percentage of capital, see infra text accompanying notes 114-19, define capital
as shareholders' equity plus "unimpaired surplus," which includes surplus and undivided
profits, capital reserves, 50% of loss reserves, and certain subordinated instruments. 12
C.F.R. § 7.1100 (1982). The loss reserve component of capital under these regulations will
be increased to 100%, effective April, 1983. See 47 Fed. Reg. 56,863 (1982).
Regulation of LDC Lending
The combined capital of the 159 largest internationally-active U.S.
banks, which do the vast majority of U.S. lending to LDCs, is $63.7
billion, which amounts to only about 40% of their LDC exposure. 18
Moreover, the situation is exacerbated by the concentration of LDC
loans within a relatively few countries. 19 Capital exposure to these
LDCs has risen significantly over the past three years, and most of the
17. G. JOHNSON, ASPECTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL SAFETY NET 9-12 (IMF Occasional
Paper No. 17, 1983); Pressure on Bank Regulators, N.Y. Times, Nov. 11, 1982, at Dl, col. 3.
18. See G. JOHNSON, supra note 17, at 1 I (table); see also Table 1, infra note 19.
19. Table 1 sets forth the exposure of different groups of U.S. banks to non-OPEC LDCs
(NOLDCs) and Eastern European countries expressed as a percentage of each group's ag-
gregate capital.
Table 1
LDC Exposure as Percentage of Aggregate Capital for Largest U.S. Banks Required to
File Country Exposure Lending Survey
June 1979 Dec. 1981
128 Largest 9 Largest 15 Next 104 Next 159 Largest
Banks Banks Largest Largest Banks
NOLDCs
Argentina 7 10 7 4 13
Brazil 28 39 28 14 28
Mexico 21 27 23 14 34
Philippines 6 10 7 2 8
South Korea 11 17 10 4 14
Taiwan 7 10 7 3 n/a
SUBTOTAL 80 113 82 41 97
ALL NOLDCs 112 161 109 53 123
EASTERN EUROPEAN
COUNTRIES 15 21 15 7 5
TOTAL EXPOSURE 127 182 124 60 128
To Amend the Bretton Woods Agreements Act to Authorize Consent to an Increase in the
United States Quota in the International Monetary Fund (HR 5970): Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on International Trade, Investment and Monetary Policy of the House Commr on
Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 405 (1980) (June 1979 exposures)
[hereinafter Quota Hearings]; G. JOHNSON, supra note 17, at 11 (Dec. 1981 exposures for all
countries except Taiwan).
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increase has been borne by the larger banks.20 As a result of these con-
ditions, the U.S. banks have become vulnerable to any disruption of
the recycling system.
The three largest LDC borrowers, Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina, are
experiencing severe problems in servicing their debts to private banks
and have declared temporary moratoriums on repayment.2' Many
smaller debtor countries are experiencing debt service problems similar
to those of the bigger borrowers,22 and the Federal Reserve Board's
20. G. JOHNSON, supra note 17, at 4-5; Dizard, supra note 3, at 61.
Table 2 illustrates the current exposure to Mexico of the largest U.S. banks.
Table 2
Exposure of Largest U.S. Banks to Mexico-Percentage of Aggregate Capital
Chemical Bank 91 Mellon 61
Bank of America 83 Chase Manhattan 59
Manufacturers' Hanover 77 Crocker 55
Bankers' Trust 75 First Interstate 53
Citibank 69 Security Pacific 45
First Chicago 69 Marine Midland 43
Wells Fargo 63 Continental Illinois 37
Morgan Guaranty 62
Capital exposure ratios in this table were calculated by dividing bank loan exposure by bank
capital, each expressed as a percentage of assets. See Loans to Argentina and Mexico Hurt
Banks, N.Y. Times, Dec. 2, 1982, at DI, col. 4, D13, col. 2 (lending levels); A Roundup of
Fourth Quarter Bank Results, supra note 16, at Dl, col. 4 (bank capital). The exposure of
U.S. banks to Brazil is 80% of that to Mexico; exposure to Argentina is 40% percent of that to
Mexico. See G. JOHNSON, supra note 17, at 11. Exposure to Brazil and Argentina is more
concentrated in the money center banks than that to Mexico. Ipsen, After Mexico the Re-
gionals Are in Retreat, EUROMONEY, Jan. 1983, at 58, 63.
21. After an infusion of huge credits from central banks of developed countries, from the
U.S. government, and from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), see HowMexico Lined
Up Credits, N.Y. Times, Aug. 31, 1982, at DI, col. 3, Mexico in August 1982 declared a
limited moratorium on repayment of the principal of its private and public sector foreign
loans, see Bankers Tentatively Agree to Let Mexico Delay Repayment of Some Debt Princpal,
Wall St. J., Aug. 23, 1982, at 2, col. 3.
After a similar rescue effort in the final months of 1982, Brazil was able to forestall a
moratorium. Reagan Promises to Provide Brazil a $1.2 Billion Loan, N.Y. Times, Dec. 2,
1982, at Al, col. 6. Shortly thereafter, however, the semi-governmental Banco do Brasil had
to be saved by U.S. banks from defaulting on its obligations in New York. Brazil's Biggest
Bank Is Said to Get Bailout Credit in U.S., N.Y. Times, Dec. 13, 1982, at Al, col. 2. On
December 30, 1982, Brazil announced that it would not make repayments of principal due in
January 1983. Brazilians Will Not Pay Principal Due in January, N.Y. Times, Dec. 31, 1982,
at D 1, col. 1.
Argentina declared a debt moratorium in November 1982 and forced on its foreign credi-
tors a five-year postponement of repayment. Argentina to Delay Repayment, N.Y. Times,
Nov. 19, 1982, at D 1, col. 6; IMFPlans Pressure on Banks to Help Brazil, N.Y. Times, Dec.
15, 1982, at D3, col. I.
22. See THE DEBT-BOMB THREAT, supra note 7, at 42-57 (Poland, Yugoslavia, Costa
Rica, Zaire, South Korea & Venezuela); Dizard, supra note 3, at 60-78 (Nigeria & Chile);
Pressure on Bank Regulators, supra note 17, at DI, col. 3 (Sudan); Kuczynski, Latin Ameri-
can Debt, 61 FOREIGN AFF. 344, 347 (1982-83) (Philippines); The Rumanian Debt Accord,
N.Y. Times, Dec. 8, 1982, at D9, col. 1 (Rumania); Bolivia Seeks Help on Debt, N.Y. Times,
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"vulnerability indicators"23 for most LDCs are at record high levels.2 4
It has been forecast that unless global economic conditions improve
within one year, many LDCs will be unable to meet interest payments,
much less repay loan principal.25 Moreover, as defaults caused by
financial conditions become more likely, the risk of defaults arising out
of political hostility also seems greater. 26
The repayment problems of the LDCs have been aggravated by a
sharp contraction in bank lending which itself is a reaction to the diffi-
culties being experienced by the borrowers. Many lenders, and espe-
cially the U.S. regional banks, have drastically reduced their total
exposure to LDCs.2 7 Smaller lenders, including the U.S. regional
banks, are both less committed to LDC lending and more cautious than
their money-center counterparts. 28 As international conditions have
worsened, these smaller lenders have reduced their foreign lending
sharply,2 9 while the money-center banks have been unable to withdraw
from the market for fear of causing its collapse. 30 As lending is cur-
tailed, countries previously in sound financial condition are forced into
Nov. 4, 1982, at D12, col. 5 (Bolivia); No Timefor RancorAgainst the Banks, supra note 6, at
A26, col. 1 (Ghana).
23. These indicators are composed of balance of payments data and other vital national
monetary and fiscal statistics. Gasser & Roberts, Bank Lending to Developing Countries,
FED. REs. BANK N.Y.Q. Rlv., Autumn 1982, at 25.
24. Id at 25-26. Some regulators believe that international lenders are only "at the
threshold stage" of experiencing severe loan problems, after decades of untroubled lending.
Pressure on Bank Regulators, supra note 17, at D1, col. 3.
25. Rohatyn, The State ofthe Banks, N.Y. REv. BooKs, Nov. 4, 1982, at 6, 7.
26. Id at 6. As political conflicts escalate, the cost to the LDC of default on its obliga-
tions is reduced, and the use of default as a political weapon becomes more likely.
27. This contraction is evidenced by the steep decline in the rate of growth in credit
outstanding to LDCs. Federal Reserve economists predict that total lending to LDCs would
rise only 8-12% ($25-35 billion) in 1982, as opposed to the 20% ($45 billion) increase which
occurred in 1981. Gasser & Roberts, supra note 23, at 18-19, 25-26. In nominal terms, the
credit stock has not declined, but viewed in real terms, it is virtually stagnant.
28. This is attributable to several factors: the regional banks' lack of experience with'
international lending and country risk assessment, Ipsen, supra note 20, at 58-62; Riley, How
Regional Banks Approach Country Exposure and Country Risk, J. COM. BANK LENDING,
Mar. 1980, at 33, 34, 39-40; see infra text accompanying notes 104-06; confusion regarding
the role of the Federal Reserve as a lender of last resort, G. JOHNSON, supra note 17, at 4-5,
33-34; see infra text accompanying notes 148-51; and concerns generated by SEC disclosure
requirements, Kinkead, Banks Tell (Not Quite) All About Foreign Loans, FORTUNE, Nov. 29,
1982, at 75; SEC Orders Loan Data on Poor Nations, AM. BANKER, Oct. 29, 1982, at 3, col. 1,
14, col. 1; see infra text accompanying notes 137-40. For a discussion of one regional bank's
involvement in and subsequent withdrawal from LDC lending, see Small Bank in the South
Comes to Regret Entry into Foreign Lending, Wall St. J., Mar. 25, 1983, at 1, col. 6.
29. Dizard, supra note 3, at 60, 65; Worries on Lending Abroad, N.Y. Times, Nov. 19,
1982, at Dl, col. 3, col. 4. Banks reduce their exposure to lenders by not re-lending the
proceeds of loans which are repaid. The destabilizing flight of banks from the LDC lending
market has been made easier by the trend toward shorter loan maturities. Gasser & Rob-
erts, supra note 23, at 25.
30. Ipsen, supra note 20, at 58; Dizard, supra note 3, at 61.
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payment problems as their financial base is depleted.31
Unless corrective measures are taken, the convergence of LDC re-
payment difficulties and the contraction in lending will lead banks and
LDCs to experience mutually reinforcing illiquidity and insolvency 32
which could trigger systemic financial crisis. If a number of LDC loans
were to go into default and be written off as bad debt, many banks
would become insolvent. 33 If the public were to lose confidence in
other banks and a deposit run occur, widespread bank failure and
31. Gasser & Roberts, supra note 23, at 29.
For example, Brazil's repayment problems have been worsened by this reduction in lend-
ing. IMF Plans Pressure on Banks to Help Brazil, supra note 21, at D1, col. 1. These
problems have been said to be the result of Brazil's lenders' "trying to get out." Id
32. Although the practical difference between illiquidity and insolvency is not always
clear, there is a useful conceptual distinction between liquidity problems, which involve
short-term cash shortages in otherwise sound entities, and insolvency, which implies a struc-
tural, long-term excess of liabilities over assets. G. JOHNSON, supra note 17, at 18, 31-32;
Dizard, supra note 3, at 78.
In a bank, liquidity problems could arise from an overall lending contraction or from a
short-term run on deposits, either of which would deplete the sources from which banks
meet their current obligations and fund new loans. G. JOHNSON, supra note 17, at 31-32;
Dizard, supra note 3, at 78. Liquidity problems could be countered with cash loaned by the
Federal Reserve or other sources. G. JOHNSON, supra note 17, at 18, 31. Bank insolvency,
the excess of depositors' claims (liabilities) over outstanding loans expected to be repaid
(assets), would occur if many loans had to be written off as losses, and the long-term survival
of the bank were called into question-a far more serious and difficult situation than a
liquidity "squeeze." See Grant, Can the Cooke Committee Stand the Heat, EUROMONEY,
Oct. 1982, at 39; Challengefor Central Banks, N.Y. Times, Nov. 7, 1982, at DI, col. 3, D13,
col. 1.
LDCs' financial problems also can be characterized in terms of illiquidity and insolvency.
Illiquidity connotes a temporary-albeit serious-shortfall of cash needed to fund deficits
and repayments. Pressure on Bank Regulators, supra note 17, at Dl, col. 3. Solvent coun-
tries experiencing liquidity problems are able to borrow through the liquidity crisis and
generate funds to repay their debt. Wriston, BankingAgainst Disaster, N.Y. Times, Sept. 14,
1982, at A27, col. 1. Conversely, insolvent countries have little hope of generating sufficient
funds to repay lenders and will not be extended either long- or short-term credit. Silk, Less
Jittery Financiers, N.Y. Times, Sept. 15, 1982, at D2, col. I.
Walter Wriston, a prominent banker, has characterized the present financial situation as a
liquidity problem caused by LDCs' temporary cash-flow difficulties. Wriston, supra, at A27,
col. I. A former Treasury Department official described Wriston's assessments as "sopo-
rific" and "just plain cotton candy." Silk, supra, at D2, col. 1 (quoting Robert Roosa, former
Under-Secretary of the Treasury). A spokesman for the Comptroller of the Currency has
described the liquidity crisis as one "the likes of which we've never experienced." Loans to
Argentina andMexico Hurt Banks, supra note 20, at D13, col. 2. Felix Leutwiler, the chair-
man of the Bank for International Settlements, the clearing bank for the world's central
banks, has stated that "if out of the liquidity problem there comes a solvency problem, I am
not sure we can handle it." Dizard, supra note 3, at 75.
33. If U.S. banks were to have to write off even a fraction of their LDC exposure, their
capital would be eliminated and the banking system would be rendered virtually bankrupt.
Top Banks' Third World Loans Detailed, supra note 16, at D3, col. 1; see supra notes 16-20
and accompanying text. Many officials and commentators believe that a fiscal crisis in one
or more of the large debtor LDCs easily could jeopardize U.S. banks and endanger the
global financial system. See, e.g., U.S.-Mexico TalksAre Inconclusive, N.Y. Times, Apr. 20,
1983, at A5, col. 1 (comments of Sec. of Treasury Donald Regan); House Panel Criticizes
Plan to Raise LM.F Aid, N.Y. Times, Dec. 22, 1982, at D1, col. I (same); Lever, Interna-
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financial collapse could result.34 Conversely, if in a period of crisis,
banks' short-term cash positions were to become inadequate and new
credit to LDCs were restricted, LDC borrowers might collapse for lack
of funds, which in turn could cause the failure of major international
banks. 35 Such apocalyptic scenarios may not occur, but this would not
necessarily mean that the crisis had been resolved. The present situa-
tion may simply produce an accelerating deterioration of the world
economy marked by smaller, recurrent financial crises from which re-
covery would be nearly impossible.
Although the present crisis is a product of unfavorable international
economic conditions, it strongly demonstrates a fundamental failure of
the U.S. bank regulatory system. U.S. policy currently emphasizes the
provision of stop-gap loans to LDCs and attempts-both ironic and of
doubtful success-to pressure banks to increase their LDC lending.36
The fundamental failures of the regulatory process that allowed the cri-
sis to develop are not being addressed. A new approach is needed 37
that would both mitigate the dangers posed by bank overexposure to
LDCs and forestall contraction of lending by spreading more evenly
among lenders and governments the risks and costs of LDC lending.38
II. Regulatory Objectives: Dilemma and Solution
A. The Dilemma of Bank Overexposure and Credit Undersupply
Two superficially competing concerns-the preservation of the safety
tionalBanking'r House of Cards, N.Y. Times, Sept. 24, 1982, at A27, cols. 2-5 (statement of
Lord Lever, former British Cabinet member).
34. G. JOHNSON, supra note 17, at 12, 31-32; Dizard, supra note 3, at 75. A senior eco-
nomic advisor has stated that such a deposit run would foster a crisis environment that
"could lead to a depression." Greenspan Warningon Loans, N.Y. Times, Jan. 3, 1983, at D2,
col. 1 (quoting comments of Alan Greenspan).
35. G. JOHNSON, supra note 17, at 12, 31-32. According to U.S. Treasury Secretary Re-.
gan, if international capital flows are not increased, LDCs will "go by the boards" and the
current recession could become a worldwide depression. House Panel Criticizes Plan to
Raise IM.F Aid, supra note 33, at Dl, col. 1 (testimony in favor of increased U.S. support
for the IMF).
Commenting on the general need to maintain capital flows, a financial observer concluded
that "'[lI]ending with no illusions' will be needed to 'support earlier loans that had been full
of them."' Dizard, supra note 3, at 78. In a similar vein, a "very eminent economic states-
man" has been quoted as saying "no doubt the banks have behaved foolishly, but one must
now pray that they will go on behaving foolishly." Roll, End the Chaos and Build a New
System, EUROMONEY, Sept. 1982, at 119, 121.
36. IMF Plans Pressure On Banks to Help Brazil, supra note 21, at D1, col. 1.
37. Felix Rohatyn, a prominent financier, states that "it is undeniable that both the
known facts and the potential problems argue against a policy of hoping to muddle through
with a little bit of luck. The risk of inaction is simply too great." Rohatyn, supra note 25, at
3. See also Lever, supra note 33, at A27, cols. 2-5.
38. No Timefor Rancor Against the Banks, supra note 6, at A26, col. I.
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of the U.S. banking system and the maintenance of the world financial
system-motivate the federal interest in regulating bank lending to
LDCs. Regulators and bankers have recognized an apparent tension
between the prudential regulatory concern for bank soundness and the
need for the continuation of capital flows to LDCs to maintain the sta-
bility of the international political and economic order.3 9 Effective reg-
ulatory policy must seek to harmonize these two goals.40
The broad goals of U.S. banking regulation and supervision histori-
cally have been to ensure the stability of the banking system, to protect
individual depositors, and to foster competition among banks.4' Regu-
lators maintain that the system is not intended to protect individual
banks;42 the policy assumption has been that banks and their stock-
holders and large depositors should be relatively free to assume risks,
restrained only by fear of losses and free of regulatory guarantees and
strictures.43 Nevertheless, most regulators would concede that they
probably would not allow a large bank to fail, for fear of the likely
consequences to the system.44 In fact, the regulatory system operates at
the individual bank level, despite its ostensible systemic emphasis.45
This prudential goal-the maintenance of the stability of the U.S.
banking system-underlies the federal regulation of international
banking activity.46 Many banking officials see the LDC exposure of
39. International Debt- Hearings Before the Subcomm. on International Finance of the
Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 86 (1977) (testi-
mony of Henry Wallich, Member, Board of Governors, Federal Reserve) [hereinafter Inter-
national Debt]. Wallich later expanded on this theme: "A high level of lending ... could
lead to excessive risk concentration ... while ... a low level ... may make it difficult for
these countries to finance their anticipated current-account deficits ... " Quota Hearings,
supra note 19, at 394. See also Roll, supra note 35, at 121.
40. Wallich's solution is to "avoid excessive lending" but to "avoid a sharp curtailment"
of lending. Quota Hearings, supra note 19, at 394. See also Cooke, Supervising Multinational
Banking Organizations: Evolving Techniquesfor Cooperation Among Supervisory Authorities,
3 J. COMP. CORP. L. & SEc. REG. 244, 254 (1981).
41. MINORITY STAFF OF HousE COMM. ON BANKING, FINANCE AND URBAN AFFAIRS,
96TH CONG., 1ST SESS., THE OPERATIONS OF U.S. BANKS IN THE INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL
MARKETS 25 (Comm. Print 1979) [hereinafter MINORITY STAFF REPORT].
42. Challenge for Central Banks, supra note 29, at DI, col. 5, D13, col. 1.
43. Confidential interview with federal bank regulator (Sept. 24, 1982).
44. Confidential interview with federal bank regulator (Sept. 24, 1982); Challenge for
CentralBanks, supra note 29, at Dl, col. 5, D13, col. 1; G. JOHNSON, supra note 17, at 34; see
infra text accompanying notes 145-47.
45. In monitoring foreign lending, "the examiners are responsible for alerting bank
management to those risks that might be difficult for a bank to absorb and might therefore
jeopardize the liquidity or soundness of the bank." A New Supervisory Approach to Foreign
Lending, supra note 13, at 2 (emphasis added).
46. When one important element of the current regulatory scheme was announced, it
was asserted that "[t]he aim is an effective supervisory system to ensure that foreign lending
does not have adverse effects on the safety and soundness of the United States banking
system." Id at 1.
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U.S. banks as a serious threat to the domestic financial system, and
hope that such exposure will be greatly reduced.47
In apparent contrast to this emphasis on reduced exposure, highly
placed U.S. policymakers have stressed the need to maintain interna-
tional capital flows to LDCs. 48 For example, during their trip to Brazil
in December 1982, both President Reagan and Treasury Secretary Re-
gan exhorted U.S. banks to lend more to that country.49 Paul Volcker,
Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, also has
stated that there is "clearly a transitional need" for LDC lending to
continue,50 and that banks would "protect their interests" by meeting
that need.51 Stressing that at this time regulatory concerns should not
interfere with LDC lending, Volcker further declared that "new credits
should not be subject to supervisory criticism."'52
The recent emphasis on the need to maintain the flow of capital is a
result of the perception that the crisis has dangerous potential conse-
quences for the United States. Obviously, collapse of the international
financial system would be catastrophic from the U.S. perspective, but
other, less dramatic dangers are present as well. Federal Reserve econ-
omists predict that reductions in bank lending to LDCs could cause
47. Regulators feel that banks should not "continue to carry this burden over the long
term." Quota Hearings, supra note 19, at 477 (testimony of Lewis Odom, First Deputy
Comptroller of the Currency). Congressional sentiment motivated by the current situation
also favors more "disciplined" (that is, less) lending to LDCs. See Banks' Bidfor Aid Stirs
Old, Deep Resentments, N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 1983, at DI, col. 4; House Unit Spars With
Bankers, N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1983, at D7, col. 4; House Panel Criticizes Plan to Raise IM.F
Aid, supra note 33, at DI, col. 1.
48. This attitude also contrasts with years of high-level indifference to LDC lending. See
Quota Hearings, supra note 19, at 474, 477 (1980 testimony of Lewis Odom that U.S. bank
regulators "neither encourage nor discourage" international lending); id at 398 (1980 testi-
mony of Henry Wallich that "[b]ank lending to [LDCs]. . .is not directly constrained by
regulatory policy"). Before the onset of the present crisis, official concern was limited to
determinations by middle-level regulators that banks had the resources necessary to conduct
international lending. Id
49. Reagan Promises to Provide Brazil a $1.2 Billion Loan, supra note 21, at A1, col. 6.
Secretary Regan is known to favor continued private lending to LDCs. Confidential inter-
view with federal bank regulator (Sept. 24, 1982). Senior policymakers also are trying to
coerce banks into maintaining and increasing their lending to Mexico, although they have
no legal power to compel them to do so. Fed Push on Foreign Loans Seen, N.Y. Times, Jan.
15, 1983, at 29, col. 6, 35, cols. 4-6. However, regulators still are basically unwilling to tell
banks specifically in which countries to lend and how to limit their LDC exposure. See
Pressure on Bank Regulators, supra note 17, at DI, col. 3.
50. Brazil Requests a Further Loan of $1.5 Billion, N.Y. Times, Dec. 14, 1982, at Al, col.
1, D6, col. 6.
51. Worries on Lending Abroad, N.Y. Times, supra note 29, at D 1, col. 3.
52. BrazilRequests A Further Loan of $1.5 Billion, supra note 50, at Al, col. 1, D6, col. 6.
Volcker specifically proposed that regulators would not necessarily "classify" new loans that
were made to replace already classified loans-loans previously found problematic by fed-
eral examiners. IMF Plans Pressure on Banks to Help Brazil, supra note 21, at D1, col. 1,
D3, col. 1; see generally infra text accompanying notes 89-92 (loan classification procedures).
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significant reductions in the imports and gross national products of the
countries most dependent on bank financing.53 Such economic deterio-
ration would greatly affect the United States, which sends more than
one-third of its exports to the LDCs.5 4 It has been forecast that without
increased lending to LDCs, the U.S. growth rate would decline by 1%,
the trade deficit would increase by $14 billion, and the U.S. industries
already most seriously damaged by the recession would endure further
hardship. 5
Under the present circumstances, the goals of domestic safety and of
international stability are not only compatible but indeed insepara-
ble.5 6 Continued foreign lending is required to avert defaults by
financially strapped borrowers, for such defaults would have a harmful
impact on the U.S. banking system, as well as on the general economy.
At the same time, however, the safety of the domestic banking system
must be enhanced if it is to continue to support the international econ-
omy by maintaining and increasing the supply of capital. The central
regulatory objective, then, is to develop a strategy that fosters the si-
multaneous maximization of domestic safety and continued LDC
lending.
B. Diversfcation: The Path to Solution
Federal regulation of LDC lending must be reformed by the imple-
mentation of a strategy that will foster diversification both of the loan
portfolios of the individual banks and of the pool of institutions en-
gaged in the LDC lending process. 57
The goal of diversification of banks' portfolios recognizes that if
many of a bank's loans are concentrated in single countries, it becomes
dangerously exposed to country risk that would threaten the ability of
all borrowers, public or private, within those countries to repay their
loans.5 8 Except in the seemingly unlikely case of the simultaneous col-
53. Gasser & Roberts, supra note 23, at 23.
54. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, BANK EXAMINATION FOR COUNTRY RISK AND IN-
TERNATIONAL LENDING ii (GAO/ID-82-52, 1982) [hereinafter GAO REPORT]; Lever, supra
note 33, at A27, col. 2.
55. Dizard, supra note 3, at 78. This prediction is based on the assumption that levels of
new lending remain constant; in fact, they are declining.
The LDC exposure of U.S. banks already may be affecting the U.S. financial system and
economy by slowing the decline of consumer lending rates. See Challengefor CentralBanks,
supra note 29, at Dl, col. 3.
56. Roll, supra note 35, at 121.
57. Quota Hearings, supra note 19, at 394 (testimony of Henry Wallich).
58. See supra text accompanying notes 13-15.
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lapse of many LDC borrowers, 59 banks' vulnerability to the effects of
dramatic changes in countries' economic and political situations can be
significantly reduced by the maintenance of loan portfolios that are not
weighted heavily with loans to a small number of countries or to coun-
tries with similar characteristics. 60
Diversification of individual banks' portfolios will not suffice, how-
ever, if only the present small number of banks remains involved in the
LDC lending process. Because LDCs' debts now have assumed huge
proportions, sizeable levels of country risk are forced on even the most
diversified lenders if only a few lenders are willing to extend credit.
The risk of bank failure currently is centered on the large "money-
center" banks, which are involved in most LDC lending. Because the
basic safety of the entire U.S. banking system relies on those banks, the
entire system remains in jeopardy.61
Diversification of the pool of lenders is especially attractive because
the present exposure of the U.S. banking system as a whole to LDCs,
either individually or collectively, is not excessive.62 The more critical
problem is that the exposure is too heavily concentrated in a small
number of money-center banks;63 if it were spread more evenly
through the system, the systemic danger created by the failure of a sin-
gle borrower would be mitigated greatly.64
Under the present regulatory scheme, no measures are in place that
effectively promote diversification of the portfolios of individual
banks.65 At the same time, systemic diversification actually is decreas-
59. InternationalDebt, supra note 39, at 86 (testimony of Henry Wallich). Indeed, diver-
sification helps to reduce the possibility of such a widespread financial collapse.
60. Quota Hearings, supra note 19, at 454 (testimony of Lewis Odom). See also .4 New
Supervisory Approach to Foreign Lending, supra note 13, at 5.
61. Eg., G. JOHNSON, supra note 17, at 32.
62. The aggregate capital of all U.S. commercial banks in 1980 was $115 billion. See
1980 FDIC ANNUAL REPORT 243, 245. This figure represents almost twice the 1981 capital
of the U.S. banks most heavily involved in LDC lending, see G. JOHNSON, supra note 17, at
11. Were LDC lending distributed evenly throughout the commercial banking system, the
ameliorative effect on loan concentration would be dramatic. For example, exposure to
Mexico, the LDC to which U.S. banks are most exposed, see supra note 19, would fall from
34% of capital to under 20%, a significant reduction of risk.
63. Although the combined exposure of the banks which lend to LDCs is high, this
exposure is small when compared with that of the largest individual banks. See G. JOHN-
SON, supra note 17; see also supra notes 19, 20 and accompanying text. Leaving aside the
increased involvement of other U.S. commercial banks, the even distribution of the exposure
among the 159 banks already deeply involved in LDC lending also would improve the situa-
tion greatly.
64. Systemic diversification is yet more important if LDC lending is increased. See infra
note 68.
65. The present regulatory structure does seek to limit bank overexposure, but relies
largely on an ineffective lending limit and country risk assessment process to do so. See
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ing as the smaller U.S. lenders, although often better capitalized than
their money-center counterparts, 66 and in fact well-positioned to enter
the market, nonetheless are retrenching their participation in the lend-
ing process. 67 The bank regulatory system thus must encourage portfo-
lio diversification to reduce the loan concentrations of the overexposed
banks, while at the same time diversifying and expanding the pool of
lenders which participate in LDC lending.68
III. Present Regulatory Framework: Description and Critique
A unified system of federal regulation of LDC lending has not devel-
oped; the present regulatory structure best can be described as a group
of weakly coordinated and disparate elements. One element is a uni-
form approach to the examination of foreign lending which has been
implemented by the federal bodies directly involved in the bank exami-
nation process. Other elements include statutory lending limits for na-
tional banks supervised by the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency (COC), disclosure requirements for bank holding companies
promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and
the unclear potential role of "lender of last resort" played by the Fed-
eral Reserve Board (FRB).
It is clear that these elements, considered individually, or collectively
and artificially as a regulatory system, are not achieving the promotion
of diversification that should be the object of federal regulation of over-
seas lending. The uniform approach, as presently implemented, is
deeply flawed by its over-reliance on country risk assessment and by
the ineffectiveness and inflexibility of its enforcement apparatus, while
the statutory lending limits are not responsive to bank overexposure to
country risk. The SEC's disclosure requirements are at once incom-
infra text accompanying notes 69-126. Regulatory policy explicitly must require diversifica-
tion of banks' portfolios.
66. G. JOHNSON, supra note 17, at 14.
67. The need to encourage greater participation by the regional banks often has been
recognized by federal regulators, who even have suggested that pension funds, insurance
companies, and other financial institutions become involved. See Quota Hearings, supra
note 19, at 397-99, 467, 474 (testimony of Henry Wallich and Lewis Odom); Wallich, The
Future Role of the Commercial Banks, reprintedin id at 421,428. In spite of this recognition,
current regulatory policies simply are not achieving this result.
68. Given a static demand for LDC loans and a sufficient supply of willing lenders,
portfolio diversification, which would ensure that banks not be overexposed to a few large
borrowers, would also ensure diversification of the lending pool-that each country's loans
would be spread among a number of lenders. However, since the level of lending must be
dramatically increased, and since many banks are unwilling to expand or even maintain
their present levels of exposure, portfolio diversification must be accompanied by a policy
which will expand and diversify the lending pool available to LDCs.
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plete and counterproductive, and the ambiguity surrounding the role of
the FRB in the event of crisis is having negative effects both on the
supply of capital available to LDCs and on the stability of the banking
system. Many of the critical risks now faced by the international
financial system are directly attributable to these failures of the present
scheme of bank regulation.
A. The Uniform Approach to Bank Examination
The adoption of a uniform approach to the examination of overseas
lending marked the first coordinated federal attempt to monitor foreign
lending.69 This first supervision of international activity came about in
response to the growth in U.S. foreign lending during the 1970's, basi-
cally as an extension of existing domestic regulatory principles.70 The
uniform approach is coordinated by the Interagency Country Exposure
Review Committee, an informal nine-member working group in which
the FRB, the FDIC, and the COC are represented equally. 7' In super-
vising the foreign loan examination process, the committee determines
country risk exposure levels that warrant comment by bank examiners,
reviews bank assessments of country risk, classifies countries according
to their estimated financial strength, estimates the likelihood of repay-
ment of loans that have experienced payment interruptions, and re-
quires partial or total write-offs of some of those loans.72
69. Its adoption was announced in November 1978, after several years of separate and
independent review of the issue by the three interested federal bodies. Agencies Set Int'I Risk
Exam Procedure, Am. Banker, Nov. 9, 1978, at 1, col. 3; see MINORITY STAFF REPORT,
supra note 41, at 29.
The supervision and examination of U.S. banks' foreign and domestic activities is divided
among three regulatory bodies: the Federal Reserve Board (FRB), the Office of the Comp-
troller of the Currency (COC), and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC).
The FRB is responsible for foreign activities of state member banks, bank holding compa-
nies, and Edge Act subsidiaries of all member banks; the FDIC is responsible for insured
state nonmember banks, and the COC supervises national banks. MINORITY STAFF RE-
PORT, supra note 41, at 28; Corse & Nichols, United States Government Regulation of Interna-
tional Lending by American Banks, in INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL LAW 105 (R. Rendell ed.
1980). The vast majority of international lending is undertaken by national banks. Id
In the bank examination process, federal authorities attempt to identify potential
problems through the periodic inspection of bank records and procedures. It is a principal
tool in all federal regulation of U.S. banking activity, foreign and domestic. Although the
uniform approach is applicable to the examination of all overseas loans, it is treated here
with particular attention to its role in LDC lending. See supra note 6.
70. STAFF REPORT, supra note 8, at 23-26; Cooke, supra note 40, at 248; Corse & Nich-
ols, supra note 69, at 105. The examination of a bank's foreign loans occurs as part of the
general bank examination process. GAO REPORT, supra note 54, at 1.
71. GAO REPORT, supra note 54, at 1, 3; MINORITY STAFF REPORT, supra note 41, at 28.
The Committee meets three times each year. GAO REPORT, supra note 54, at 3.
72. MINORITY STAFF REPORT, supra note 41, at 29-30. The Federal Reserve Bank of
New York supplies the Interagency Committee with the economic and political data neces-
sary to perform these tasks. GAO REPORT, supra note 54, at 4.
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The data evaluated under the uniform approach are generated
through confidential reporting required of U.S. banks having foreign
branches or certain banking subsidiaries and total foreign exposure of
$20 million or more.73 Each such bank must file semi-annually a
Country Exposure Report, which provides a comprehensive consoli-
dated account of the bank's international activity.74 The report breaks
down foreign loan exposure by country debtor or guarantor, type of
credit, type of borrower, and maturity.75 The data from the reports are
aggregated in the Country Exposure Lending Survey,76 which facili-
tates interbank comparisons and systemic analysis useful in the exami-
nation and regulatory process. 77
The bank examination process uses these comparative data to pro-
mote diversification and safety by drawing the attention of bank man-
agement to excessive or overly risky foreign exposure. 78 Examiners
analyze exposure to a given country as a percentage of the bank's capi-
tal and comment on high exposure in light of the country's condition
and the bank's capacity to absorb loss. 79 Examiners also comment on
the bank's total foreign exposure and on individual country exposure
that appears unusual by comparison to averages for the entire system.8 0
Examiners' comments are not a "directive to refrain" from lending, but
73. GAO REPORT, supra note 54, at 3; see 47 Fed. Reg. 50,389 (1982) (submission of
Country Exposure Report form by COC for review by Office of Management and Budget).
In 19&0, only 128 of the 14,000 U.S. banks fell into this category. Quota Hearings, supra
note 19, at 461 (testimony of Lewis Odom). By 1982, 159 banks were required to report.
See G. JOHNSON, supra note 17, at 11.
74. See MrNoRrry STAFF REPORT, supra note 41, at 30;.A New Supervisory Approach to
Foreign Lending, supra note 13, at 6. The COC, FRB, and FDIC use the same Country
Exposure Report form. Id; see FDIC Staff Memorandum, FDIC Supervision of Forein
Lending by Insured State Nonmember Banks, att. I, reprinted in Quota Hearings, supra note
19, at 518, 537. Further description of the Country Exposure Reports and their compilation
in the Country Exposure Lending Survey is set forth id at 518-36.
75. A New Supervisory Approach to Foreign Lending, supra note 13, at 4, 6.
76. See, e.g., Federal Reserve Board, Press Release, Country Exposure Lending Survey
(June 21, 1979).
77. A New Supervisory Approach to Foreign Lending, supra note 13, at 1.
78. Id at 3; GAO REPORT, supra note 54, at 3.
79. A New Supervisory Approach to Foreign Lending, supra note 13, at 5. The comment
process is linked to the categorization of countries' financial strength made by the Inter-
agency Committee. See infra text accompanying notes 82-85. "Special comments" are to be
made if a bank's exposure to a "moderately strong" or "weak" country exceeds 15% or 10%,
respectively. GAO REPORT, supra note 54, at 5. At the examiner's discretion, a comment
may be made if exposure to a "moderately strong" country falls between 10% and 15% of
capital, or if exposure to a "weak" country falls between 5% and 10%. Id Examiners list
"concentrations of country exposures" exceeding 25%, 10%, and 5% of capital to strong,
moderately strong, and weak countries, respectively. Id Examiners also retain discretion as
to the degree to which a comment will be "highlighted" in the examination report. Id at 16.
80. A New Supervisory Approach to Foreign Lending, supra note 13, at 5; GAO REPORT,
supra note 54, at 14-15.
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only advise bank management of levels of exposure "worthy of
review."81
Under the uniform approach, the staff of the Federal Reserve Bank
of New York also conducts its own country risk analysis by assessing
the "relative strength of different countries" as it may have impact on
the U.S. banking system. 82 The staff has developed a screening mecha-
nism based on balance of payments indicators to flag countries for in-
depth analysis in which economists and country specialists probe the
LDC's debt structure, debt maturity profile, and other measures of eco-
nomic and political well-being.8 3 The results of its analysis are passed
on to the Interagency Committee, which uses them to categorize coun-
tries according to their financial strength.84 The goal of this process is
to convey an independent appraisal that banks might compare with
their own assessments.8 5
The uniform approach also requires that federal examiners evaluate
the country risk methodology used by individual banks.8 6 Examiners
verify that the banks are using reliable and timely information, and
that the information is reviewed frequently.87 In order to ensure that
country risk analysis is conducted without bias, the examiners also in-
sist that the bank demonstrate the organizational separation of the
country risk analysis unit from the loan marketing process. 88
The sole direct sanction available under the uniform approach8 9 is
81. Quota Hearings, supra note 19, at 398 (testimony of Henry Wallich); see also GAO
REPORT, supra note 54, at 1.
82. A New Supervisory Approach to Foreign Lending, supra note 13, at 4-5. There is a
tension between this analysis and the traditional reluctance of U.S. bank regulators to rate
the creditworthiness of LDC borrowers, which inevitably would influence the allocation of
credit among particular countries. Id. at 3; Quota Hearings, supra note 19, at 398-99 (testi-
mony of Henry Wallich); Pressure on Bank Regulators, supra note 17, at D3, cols. 4-5.
83. A New Supervisory Approach to Foreign Lending, supra note 13, at 4-5; GAO RE-
PORT, supra note 54, at 4-5. More qualitative "country studies" also are prepared. Id at 4-5.
84. GAO REPORT, supra note 54, at 3. The four categories are "strong," "moderately
strong," "weak," and "classified." Id
85. Quota Hearings, supra note 19, at 445 (testimony of Lewis Odom). The FRB econo-
mists who perform these analyses consider their assessments potentially inferior to those of
the banks, because they feel the banks have greater experience, closer contacts with the
LDCs, and the incentives of the profit motive. Confidential interview with federal bank
regulator (Sept. 24, 1982); see also A New Supervisory Approach to Foreign Lending, supra
note 13, at 3. They believe, however, that this difference in quality is growing smaller. Con-
fidential interview with federal bank regulator (Sept. 24, 1982).
86. A New Supervisory Approach to Foreign Lending, supra note 13, at 3; GAO REPORT,
supra note 54, at 5-6.
87. Id at 5.
88. Id
89. The bank regulatory system can impose indirect sanctions and incentives by linking
banks' cooperation with the regulatory system to its cooperation or resistance on unrelated
issues. Confidential interviews with U.S. bank executives (Sept. 19, 26, Dec. 29, 1980, Feb.
13, 1981). Thus, for example, banks which would not respond to governmental pressure to
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the power of the Interagency Committee to "classify" any or all of a
country's loans if payments from the country on one or more loans are
interrupted for reasons considered to be connected with country riskY0
The committee may classify loans into one of three categories: "sub-
standard" (or "non-performing"), "doubtful," or "loss," each of which
results in a reduction of the bank's earnings.91 Loans may not be "de-
classified" until the debtor country is judged to have rectified com-
pletely its payment situation.92
Classification can be a two-step process involving administrative dis-
cretion at both levels. On the basis of its assessment of the likelihood
of repayment, the Interagency Committee can classify some or all loans
made to a given country and can assign loans to different classifications
according to the type of borrower or maturity schedule.93 If the Inter-
agency Committee has classified some loans as "doubtful," the second
step of the classification process is called into play; bank examiners
must decide after negotiating with the banks what percentage of a
doubtful loan to write off. Although discretion is broad in the classifi-
cation process itself, the Interagency Committee does not begin the
process until a payment interruption believed to involve country risk
has occurred or is judged to be "imminent. ' '94
In appraising the uniform approach, perhaps its gravest defect is that
it overemphasizes the value of country risk assessment as a regulatory
tool. The Interagency Committee, by categorizing countries on the ba-
sis of country risk analysis as well as by instructing bank examiners to
monitor the country risk methodology used by individual banks, relies
too heavily on this type of analysis. It appears to give its imprimatur to
the soundness of the technique as a device to limit bank overexposure.
This reliance is unfounded, however, for country risk analysis, whether
conducted by government regulators or by banks themselves, is of
extend credit to LDCs might encounter a lack of regulatory cooperation in their opening of
domestic or foreign branches, be refused access to discount loans, or be placed on a list
maintained by the Federal Reserve of banks in questionable financial condition.
90. GAO REPORT, supra note 54, at 3-5; Quota Hearings, supra note 19, at 398-99 (testi-
mony of Henry Wallich).
91. The extent of the reduction depends on the classification. Classification of the loan
as "substandard" has the consequence that interest on the loan cannot be accrued on the
bank's books. Classification as "doubtful" requires that some percentage of the loan to be
negotiated between the bank and government examiners must be counted against the bank's
general loan loss provisions. Classification as a "loss," the most severe sanction, causes a
special 100% write-off of the loan. Confidential interview with federal bank regulator (Apr.
20, 1983).
92. Id (Sept. 24, 1982).
93. See GAO REPORT, supra note 54, at 3 & n.3.
94. Quota Hearings, supra note 19, at 398-99 (testimony of Henry Wallich).
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doubtful utility.95 Political risk, which is crucial to the evaluation of
country risk, has proven virtually impossible to predict and evaluate. 96
Interest rates and commodity prices, also central to country risk analy-
sis, are equally difficult to forecast.97 Furthermore, payment difficulties
experienced by one country may undermine bank confidence in other-
wise sound debtor countries, thereby creating further payment difficul-
ties unlikely to have been anticipated by country risk assessment
models.98 In sum, the relevant variables are so unpredictable as to
render problematic even the most elaborate and careful country risk
analysis. 99
Even when country risk is forecast correctly, banks may fail to heed
the danger signals.lc ° This phenomenon is probably explained by two
factors. Bank lending officers, who tend to deprecate country risk anal-
ysis, often prevail over skeptical bank economists, probably for reasons
of the bank's interest in growth, short-term profit, and the maintenance
95. This is not to suggest that risk assessment is not of entrepreneurial value to banks,
but rather that because country risk assessment is problematic, and because it might require
the allocation of credit among borrowers, it should not be relied upon by the bank regula-
tory system as a means of protecting against overexposure to risk.
Even the entrepreneurial utility of the technique may be limited. Country risk is so diffi-
cult to assess that it may be impossible to assign prices to foreign loans that accurately reflect
underlying risk. Roll, supra note 35, at 123; G. JOHNSON, supra note 17, at 13.
96. The Iranian revolution and the Falklands war demonstrated the impracticability of
forecasting major political change, which can drastically alter a nation's country risk situa-
tion. Anderson, More Models than Vogue Magazine, EUROMONEY, Nov. 1982, at 41, 43.
Political developments need not be so dramatic as revolution or war tb affect country risk
significantly. For example, in lending to Eastern Bloc countries, the banks appear mistak-
enly to have relied on the "umbrella theory," which held that the Soviet Union would in
effect guarantee the loans of its satellites. Id at 43, 45.
97. Id at 44. The precipitous fall in oil prices that helped cause the Mexican payment
crisis was foreseen neither by Mexico nor by its lenders. Taming Mexico's Passionfor More,
N.Y. Times, Sept. 12, 1982, § 3, at 1, col. 2.
98. For example, Brazil experienced precisely this problem in the aftermath of the re-
payment difficulties of Mexico and Argentina. See Brazil Requests a Further Loan of $1.5
Billion, supra note 50.
99. Federal regulators are aware of this weakness. A New Supervisory Approach to For-
eign Lending, supra note 13, at 3 ("great uncertainties... exist in any assessment of country
risk"). Nonetheless, the uniform approach remains heavily dependent on country risk
analysis.
100. For example, lending to both Mexico and Argentina continued at high volume until
the time payments were interrupted. Gasser & Roberts, supra note 23, at 27; see also Eich-
ler, supra note 15, at 773. These situations appear to have been exceptional, for banks his-
torically have slowed lending to LDCs one or more years before the onset of repayment
problems. Gasser & Roberts, supra note 23, at 27. The Mexican and Argentine "excep-
tions" are quite troubling, however, in view of the importance of both countries and the
magnitude of their debts. Ironically, awareness of political risk may have exacerbated this
tendency by permitting acceptable levels of such risk to justify continued lending and divert
attention from economic factors which argued for the suspension of credit. Anderson, supra
note 96, at 42.
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of customer relationships.101 Also, continued lending may appear to
offer the only protection for a bank's outstanding medium or long-term
debt to the LDC.
In short, attention to country risk analysis is inadequate to serve as a
guiding regulatory principle for the effective management of bank ex-
posure to country risk. It seems to be reliable only in predicting near-
term or very long-term conditions, 0 2 while the stable, efficient lending
time frame is of medium term.'0 3 This asymmetry causes country risk
analysis to have a distorting effect on lending decisions. Country risk
analysis fosters a misleading impression of accuracy, which has led to
extensive loan concentration in a group of countries which appeared to
have low country risk, but which currently are experiencing severe re-
payment difficulties. When country risk analysis counsels caution,
large, money-center banks with a stake in continued lending are likely
to disregard it.104 At the same time, the regulatory emphasis on coun-
try risk analysis may deter participation in the lending process by re-
gional banks, for their lack of independent country risk analysis
capability may make them reluctant or unable to lend. 05 In this way,
country risk analysis may exacerbate the lack of diversification in the
pool of LDC lenders.1°6 While banks undoubtedly will continue to
make use of country risk analysis, it is vulnerable to serious criticism,
and the emphasis given it by the uniform approach is fundamentally
misguided.
A second failing of the uniform approach is that the comment proce-
dures of the examination process have been largely ineffective in influ-
encing bank behavior.107 Moreover, the discretion afforded regulators
in both the comment and the classification processes has precluded the
emergence of clear standards, 08 and the comments that are made are
101. Anderson, supra note 96, at 43; Quota Hearings, supra note 19, at 443 (testimony of
Lewis Odom).
102. These forecasts might be expressed in terms of months or decades. Anderson, supra
note 96, at 43.
103. P. WELLONS, supra note 8, at 25.
104. Ipsen, supra note 20, at 65.
105. Id at 58-62, 65; Small Bank in the South Comes to Regret Entry into Foreign Lend-
ing, supra note 28, at 1, col 6; Riley, supra note 28, at 34, 39-40; Dizard, The Revolution in
Assessing Country Risk, INsT'orTtoNAL INVESTOR, Oct. 1978, at 65, 75.
106. Ironically, it has been maintained that the policy of the federal bank authorities has
been to rely on diversification to control overexposure because of the difficulty of assessing
country risk. FDIC Staff Memorandum, supra note 74, at 520.
107. A recent General Accounting Office report found that comments on LDC exposure
made during the examination process had "little impact" on bank lending. GAO REPORT,
supra note 54, at 20-21. "A large majority" of the special comments made on LDC loans in
1979 had to be reiterated in 1980. Id at 20.
108. I d at 6-7, 13-16.
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rarely strong enough.'0 9
The one regulatory sanction available to the bank examiners, loan
classification and the accompanying reduction of earnings, is difficult
to impose in its present form without causing more harm than good. At
present, classification does not occur before the interruption of pay-
ments; thus, problem loans rescheduled without interruption cannot be
classified. 10 Should an interruption actually occur, immediate write-
offs could complicate an already difficult situation, and even provoke
systemic crisis. The relative harshness of the sanctions that follow a
"loss" or "doubtful" classification has made regulators reluctant to im-
pose them; instead, they often choose to classify loans as "non-perform-
ing," which reduces the impact on earnings substantially."' In sum,
under the uniform approach the Interagency Committee is able to
monitor bank lending to LDCs, but the banks, under no obligation to
follow its recommendations and generally unaffected by its one sanc-
tion,112 largely have remained free to pursue their own course.113
B. Statutory Lending Limits
The second element of the federal regulatory scheme is the system of
statutory lending limits administered by the Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency. In 1979, under the authority of federal statutory lan-
guage that limited to ten percent of capital the exposure of a national
bank to any borrower, 14 the COC promulgated regulations which ap-
plied this lending limit to any public sector borrower in a foreign coun-
try. 115 The intent of the new regulations was to diversify banks'
international .portfolios and thus to reduce the concentration of bank
109. Id at 6-7. The entire comment process, based as it is on moral suasion, seems
unlikely to be effective in the U.S. The problem may lie in the difficulty of coordinating on
an individual basis policies applicable to such a large number of banks. See id at 13-16.
110. Confidential interview with federal bank regulator (Sept. 24, 1982).
111. Mayer, supra note 3, at 48.
112. Bank supervisors recently urged banks to provide special reserves for troubled in-
ternational loans, but the banks successfully lobbied against the measures on the ground that
the establishment of such reserves would reduce earnings. Pressure on Bank Regulators,
supra note 17, at D3, col. 1.
113. Pressure on Bank Regulators, supra note 17, at D3, cols. 1-6.
114. 12 U.S.C. § 84 (1976). The purpose of the statute and accompanying regulations is
to foster the general diversification of bank lending. See 12 C.F.R. § 7.1310(b) (1982). The
statutory limit recently was raised to 15% of capital. Gan-St. Germain Depository Institu-
tions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, § 401, 96 Stat. 1469, 1508-10 (1982); see Pressure on
Bank Regulators, supra note 17, at DI, col. 3, D3, col. 4.
115. Loans to foreign governments, their agencies and instrumentalities, 44 Fed. Reg.
22,714 (1979) (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 7.1330 (1982)). These regulations were reaffirmed
officially in 1983. 48 Fed. Reg. 15,844-54 (1983) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 32.5(d)).
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lending in particular countries or areas. 116
To prevent the circumvention of the lending limit by the extension of
loans to multiple state entities not truly separate from one another, the
regulations require that each public sector borrower pass a two-
pronged "means and purposes" test. 1 7 In order to satisfy the means
test, the borrower must demonstrate that its own sources of revenue are
sufficient to service its debt." 8 The purposes test is met if the loan is to
be used for a purpose consistent with the borrower's general
business. 119
Although bank regulators maintain that the present lending limit is
effective in aiding diversification,1 20 this confidence appears to be mis-
placed. Because it enforces no limit on total lending to individual
countries,' 2' it fails to confront the crucial effect of the LDC's overall
political and economic situation on the ability of borrowers to repay
their external debt. The economic health and domestic cash position of
individual borrowers in an LDC become quite irrelevant in times of
national economic difficulty. This interdependence requires that loans
to all economic entities within an LDC be considered effectively to
have been made to a single borrower. 22 Because the means and pur-
poses test is met easily by most LDCs' public sector borrowers and does
not apply to the private sector borrowers which hold a substantial por-
tion of the foreign debt in the larger LDC borrowers, 123 overall bank
exposure to LDCs has come to exceed by many times the public sector
borrower exposure limit. 24 Moreover, even if the regulations were ef-
116. MINoRiTY STAFF REPORT, supra note 41, at 31.
117. 12 C.F.R. § 7.1330 (1982).
118. 12 C.F.R. § 7.1330(a)(1) (1982). The bank's assessment of the borrower's means
must be set forth. 12 C.F.R. § 7.1330(b)(4) (1982). Although a presumption of dependence
is created if more than 50% of its operating revenue is provided by the central government, a
central government guarantee of the borrower's debts is not necessarily inconsistent with the
requirements of the means test. Id
119. 12 C.F.R. § 7.1330(a)(2) (1982). A written representation is sufficient to satisfy the
purposes test, unless the bank has reason to know that the loan will be used for a different
purpose. 12 C.F.R. § 7.1330(b)(5) (1982).
The regulations also require that banks maintain certain information on the borrower,
including its legal status and past and current financial statements. 12 C.F.R. § 7.1330(b)(l)-
(3) (1982).
120. Quota Hearings, supra note 19, at 442 (testimony of Lewis Odom).
121. Bank regulators are cognizant of this fact, but maintain that the limit fosters diver-
sification. Id
122. GAO REPORT, supra note 54, at 12. In time of crisis, LDCs' central banks and
exchange control authorities play a pivotal role in authorizing and providing hard currency
for the repayment of external debt. The little foreign exchange that may be available often
arbitrarily is allocated to repay government debt. See Loans to Argentina and Mexico Hurt
Banks, supra note 20, at D l, col. 4, D13, col. I.
123. See id at Dl, col. 4.
124. See supra notes 19-20.
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fective as drafted, it appears that some banks have been permitted to
disregard the limits in lending to certain LDCs. 25
The present statutory lending limit has been grossly ineffective in
either containing foreign exposure or promoting diversification. 26
This failure, combined with the ineffectiveness of the uniform ap-
proach, has produced chronic, acute, and perilous bank overexposure
to individual LDCs.
C. The Securities and Exchange Commission and Public Disclosure of
Lending Activity
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), in the exercise of
its power to require public disclosure of information material to inves-
tors in publicly traded companies, recently initiated a program to re-
quire bank holding companies to disclose certain data about the
foreign loans of their bank subsidiaries. 127 In announcing this program,
it declared that the "unusual risk and uncertainties" associated with
country repayment problems constituted material information within
the scope of its regulatory authority. 28 It further asserted that greater
than normal credit risks are present in LDC lending in general and that
bank disclosure practices in recent SEC filings had varied widely.129
125. Pressure on Bank Regulators, supra note 17, at D3, col. 4.
126. Although bank regulators are cognizant of the importance of diversification, partic-
ularly in light of the difficulty of country risk assessment, Quota Hearings, supra note 19, at
452-53 (testimony of Lewis Odom), and also realize that country risk is implicated in all
external currency loans to foreign countries, whether to public or private borrowers, id, they
concede nevertheless that the present lending limits "are not directly related to country ex-
posure," id An FRB official candidly admits that the exposure of the banks heavily involved
m LDC lending is larger than it should be, Pressure on Bank Regulators, supra note 17, at
D3, col. 1, while a recent General Accounting Office report "criticized regulators for inef-
fectively restraining bank exposure to foreign countries," id
127. SEC Staff Accounting Bull. No. 49, Disclosures by Bank Holding Companies
About Certain Foreign Loans, 47 Fed. Reg. 49,627-28 (1982) (to be compiled at 17 C.F.R.,
pt. 211) [hereinafter SAB-49]. Staff Accounting Bulletins are issued by the staff of the SEC
to resolve urgent questions of accounting policy. SEC Orders Loan Data on Poor Nations,
supra note 28, at 3, col. 1, 14, col. 1. Although they are not the result of official action by the
Commission, and therefore lack binding force, they are treated by the investment commu-
nity with the same deference as SEC regulations. Id
The SEC took this action in response to a decision by bank regulators to relax proposed
disclosure requirements relatng to past due loans. See Loan Rules Clared, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 27, 1982, at D20, col. 5.
128. SAB-49, supra note 127, at 49,627.
These disclosure requirements were augmented by StaffAccounting Bull. No. 49A, which
requires the disclosure of debt renegotiations between banks and LDCs. 48 Fed. Reg. 3585
(1983) (to be compiled at 17 C.F.R., pt. 211) [hereinafter SAB-49A].
129. SAB-49, supra note 127, at 49,627.
The SEC disclosure scheme was endorsed by both the Chairman of the FDIC and the
Comptroller of the Currency for the reason that it would lead to greater prudence on the
part of the banks. Bennett, Pushing Banks Into the Open, N.Y. Times, Oct. 27, 1982, at D2,
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Banks are given two options for compliance under this disclosure
scheme. 30 Under the first, the bank must disclose its total exposure to
countries which are experiencing debt service problems and to which
more than one percent of the bank's total outstanding loans have been
lent. 31 Exposure to individual countries may be aggregated unless
there exist "heavy concentrations in any country."' 32 The bank also
must describe the potential impact of problem loans on its financial
condition. 33 Under the second option, the bank discloses separately
the magnitude of its exposure to each country in which it has lent more
than one percent of outstanding loans, regardless of the borrower's
payments situation.1's As under the first option, specific disclosure of
any "material adverse impact" on the bank's financial condition is re-
quired.135 These requirements represent a significant departure from
previous bank disclosure procedures under which banks could aggre-
gate their foreign exposure into regional blocs from which individual
countries and problem loans could not be isolated. 36
Despite the endorsement they have received from different bank reg-
ulators, the recently promulgated SEC disclosure requirements have
created as many problems as they have solved. First, there is a funda-
mental tension between public disclosure and the basic assumptions of
bank regulation, which stress the importance of maintaining public
confidence through discreet governmental supervision.137 These data
could lead insured depositors to withdraw funds from particular banks
cols. 2-3; Country Loan Limits May Be Put on Banks, Conover Warns, Am. Banker, Nov. 15,
1982, at 14, col. 1.
Bank regulators traditionally have relied on confidential suasion to accomplish their
goals; until quite recently, public disclosure of an individual bank's position was anathema.
Bennett, supra, at D2, col. 1; confidential interview with federal bank regulator (Sept. 24,
1982). It is often argued that the public would overreact to disclosure of a troubled bank's
situation and cause a fatal deposit run on a bank that otherwise would be saved. Bennett,
supra, at D2, cols. 1-2. In any case, it is argued, public disclosure would not benefit the
depositors, because they already are protected by FDIC insurance. Bennett, supra, at D2,
col. 1. Since bank supervisors' deep-seated antagonism to public disclosure persists, confi-
dential interview with federal bank regulator (Sept. 24, 1982), it seems that their approval of
the SEC's disclosure directives is indicative of the growing sense of urgency with which they
view the need to control lending risk.
130. SAB-49, supra note 127, at 49,628.
131. Id
132. Id
133. The bank must provide an "indication as to the effect" on its financial condition of
loans to "countries that are currently experiencing liquidity problems." Id
134. Id
135. Id
136. Kinkead, supra note 28, at 75.
137. Bennett, supra note 129, at D2, col. 1. Bank executives maintain that the informa-
tion made public under the disclosure standards is subject to misinterpretation. Kinkead,
supra note 28, at 75.
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or from the system as a whole, either of which could cause potentially
severe liquidity problems. 138 It remains unclear whether the public will
be able to evaluate LDC creditworthiness from the disclosed data. 139
Indeed, disclosure may exacerbate the market contraction caused by
the retreat of regional banks from the LDC lending market, 140 with the
resulting dangerous consequences for the U.S. banking and interna-
tional financial systems.
Second, if effective disclosure of high levels of country exposure were
to be deemed desirable, 41 the SEC requirements are plainly inade-
quate. Several lending exposures of just less than one percent of total
outstanding loans could exceed a bank's capital and pose significant
undisclosed risk. Moreover, the regulations still permit the aggregation
of loan balances under some circumstances. 142 The disclosure of loans
made to the offshore subsidiaries of a problem country's banks also is
not required, although the risk associated with that country may have
profound effects on the loans' repayment prospects.143 Finally, banks
are left with substantial discretion to determine whether a given LDC
merits "problem" status for disclosure purposes. 144
D. The Role of the Federal Reserve Board
The final element of federal involvement in the regulation of LDC
lending is the indirect influence on international banking exerted by
two distinct Federal Reserve Board (FRB) policies.
The FRB's major indirect influence on LDC lending is exerted not
by regulation, but rather by the hidden effect that the FRB inevitably
has on bank behavior by virtue of its potential role as "lender of last
resort." Were the FRB to play such a role, in the event of a financial
crisis it would assist otherwise solvent banks experiencing temporary
cash shortages by providing collateralized short-term injections of
funds. 145 Although the official position of the FRB is that it would not
rescue an insolvent bank that had written off much of its loan portfo-
138. See Bennett, supra note 129, at D2, col. 1.
139. Kinkead, supra note 28, at 75.
140. This would occur because of pressure to withdraw from LDC lending from unduly
alarmed bank stockholders and boards of directors. See Ipsen, supra note 20, at 65;
Kinkead, supra note 28, at 75; SEC Orders Loan Data on Poor Nations, supra note 28, at 14,
cols. 1-4.
141. See infra text accompanying notes 182-84.
142. Kinkead, supra note 28, at 75.
143. Id
144. Id; SEC Orders Loan Data on Poor Nations, supra note 28, at 14, cols. 1-4; see
supra notes 131-34 and accompanying text.
145. See MINoRrrY STAFF REPORT, supra note 41, at 40; G. JOHNSON, supra note 17, at
18.
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lio,14 6 it is widely believed that the FRB, out of fear of the likely sys-
temic consequences, would not allow a major bank to fail. 147
The "safety-net" role of the FRB as a lender of last resort thus re-
mains fundamentally ambiguous, a condition which exacerbates pres-
ent uncertainty. I48 There should exist some central bank facility to
protect banks against solvency shocks caused by nonperforming LDC
assets, for the social costs of bank failures far exceed their private
costs.149 The FRB seems to maintain that it will not function as such a
lender of last resort for insolvent banks, but its pronouncements are so
delphic that its eventual behavior cannot be predicted. 50 The FRB's
stance, far from advancing its goal of promoting prudence, may only
inhibit the regional banks' participation in LDC lending, 151 while the
money-center banks continue to lend, perhaps mistakenly confident
that the FRB would intervene, were the situation to become desperate.
This ambiguity-thus exacerbates the lack of diversification that federal
policy instead should be rectifying.
The second indirect influence of the FRB on LDC lending results
from the effect on interest rates of its control of U.S. monetary pol-
icy.' 52 It has been speculated that a primary purpose behind the recent
drop in U.S. interest rates brought about by the FRB was to strengthen
the banking system weakened by its LDC exposure. 5 3
146. Challengefor Central Banks, supra note 29, at DI, col. 5, D13, col. 1.
147. Id The smaller depositors of any major bank are protected by the FDIC, but there
is no protection from country risk for the bank itself and its stockholders. International Debt,
supra note 39, at 87 (testimony of Henry Wallich).
148. G. JoHNsoN, supra note 17, at 18. The problem of providing a lender of last resort
confronts the central banks of all developed countries. The "Group of Ten" developed
countries, which includes the U.S., in September 1974 issued a mutual statement outlining
the role and capacity of central banks in this context. It declared that "[w]hile it is not
practical to lay down in advance detailed rules and procedures for the temporary support to
banks experiencing liquidity difficulties, the means are available for that purpose and will be
used if and when necessary." Grant, supra note 29, at 39 (quoting joint statement of Group
of Ten). A central banker has described this statement as "deliberately delphic" in order "to
encourage prudence and market discipline." Interpretations of its effect are varied: it may
protect the entire system, or only large banks; it may provide protection for solvency shocks
arising from total losses on loans, or it may only cover short-term liquidity problems. Id;
Challenge for Central Banks, supra note 29, at Dl, col. 5, D13, col. 1.
149. G. JOHNSON, supra note 17, at 34.
150. Id
151. Id at 33-34.
152. Through different open market and regulatory activities, the FRB controls the
money supply and its effect on interest rates. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 263, 347, 461 (1976); see also
J. LIGHT & W. WHITE, THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM 248-49 (1979).
153. Dizard, supra note 3, at 60; Silk, Behind Fed's Move on Rates, N.Y. Times, Aug. 27,
1982, at D2, col. 1. The timing of the FRB's intervention into the market seems to confirm
this hypothesis. The FRB's downward push on interest rates began within days of Mexico's
first payment interruption. N.Y. Times, Aug. 17, 1982, at Dl, col. I. It seems plausible that
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The drop in interest rates has increased bank profitability, 54 which
has allowed the banks to bolster their capital base,' 55 has made less
onerous any write-offs that might occur on LDC loan defaults, 56 and
also may make possible increased LDC lending. 57 At the same time,
declining interest rates also improved the payments position of the
LDCs by reducing the floating interest on their debt.' 58 Thus, in spite
of the widespread public opposition to any "bail-out" of overextended
banks, 159 the lowering of interest rates has aided the banks signifi-
cantly, without requiring them to bear any of the burden, and without
significant public scrutiny.
IV. A New Regulatory Structure for LDC Lending
The twin objectives of U.S. regulation of overseas lending, the pro-
tection of the U.S. banking system and the stabilization of the interna-
tional financial regime, have not been achieved by the present
regulatory framework. Bank overexposure to LDCs has reached levels
far beyond any standard of prudence, while a contraction of lending
threatens to drive many LDCs into default. A different structure is
needed which will not only diversify the loan portfolios of banks which
lend to LDCs but also diversify and enlarge the pool of funds available
to the LDC lending market. It is imperative that broader participation
in LDC lending be encouraged, in order both to diversify lenders' port-
folios and to expand the flow of capital to LDCs.
These objectives should be achieved by the establishment of a coun-
try exposure limit in conjunction with an optional, government-backed
insurance plan. The former would limit the concentration of individ-
ual LDCs' loans in banks' holdings, while the latter would encourage
smaller banks as well as non-bank institutions to enter the lending mar-
ket and permit banks to expand their LDC lending activities without
increasing exposure to country risk. As part of the insurance system,
the Federal Reserve Board would refuse definitely any role as lender of
last resort with respect to banks endangered by LDC lending, and
banks would be permitted to decline insurance upon disclosure of their
uninsured exposure. Under this regulatory system, the objective of di-
it was the potentially devastating impact of this crisis on the already troubled U.S. banks
that finally prompted the relaxation of the severe monetarist policy then in place.
154. Id; Mayer, supra note 3, at 47-48.
155. Kinkead, supra note 28, at 75.
156. Mayer, supra note 3, at 47-48.
157. Id
158. The Debt-Bomb Threat, supra note 7, at 51.
159. See infra note 166.
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versification of portfolios and lenders would be achieved, and many
unnecessary and ineffectual elements of the present system would be
eliminated.
A. The Country Exposure Limit
A limit on banks' total lending in individual countries should be en-
acted to reduce individual banks' exposures to country risk and to in-
crease the diversification of their loan holdings. This country exposure
limit would set a ceiling, stated as a percentage of a bank's capital, on
aggregate loan exposure to sovereign and private entities located in a
given country. 160
The country exposure limit should be uniform for total lending in
each country because of the practical difficulties in differentiating the
risks posed by different borrower countries and because of the risk of
political interference in the capital allocation process.161 The country
limit should be at the level above which a bank's solvency162 would be
threatened if the debtor country were to experience severe payment dif-
ficulties, but should be set as high as possible so as to minimize its
restrictive effect on lending.
160. Aggregate bank loan exposure to individual countries already is used for examina-
tion purposes by the Interagency Committee. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
Disclosure of such exposure already is required of bank holding companies by the SEC. See
supra notes 130-34 and accompanying text.
Limits on a bank's overall foreign exposure would not be necessary since the likelihood of
several concurrent country defaults is not great, except in the event of a major financial
collapse. International Debt, supra note 39, at 86 (testimony of Henry Wallich). Indeed, the
country exposure limit proposed here reduces the possibility of such a chain of country
defaults and bank failures by encouraging the diversification of bank portfolios. Neverthe-
less, precautions against individual banks' excessive foreign exposure could be implemented.
See infra note 175 (mandatory insurance for high foreign loan concentrations).
While the problems of LDC borrowers can derive from similar regional or economic
causes, the factors affecting country risk are so numerous that exposure limits must be set at
the level of individual countries. A system which would fix different lending limits for re-
gions or for groups of countries would be susceptible to the same faults as individual country
risk analysis. See supra notes 95-99 and accompanying text.
161. See Federal Reserve Board Press Release 6 (Apr. 11, 1983) (statement of Paul
Volcker before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs) [hereinafter
Volcker Statement]; Proposal to Set Country Lending Limits on International Loans Finds No
Favor Outside of Congress and Regulatory Agencies, WASH. FIN. REP. (BNA), No. 40, at 664-
65 (Mar. 28, 1983) [hereinafter Proposal to Set Country Lending Limits!; Pressure on Bank
Regulators, supra note 17, at D3, col. 4. Uniform country exposure limits have been op-
posed on the ground that they would be too rigid given differences in borrowers' capacity to
absorb debt. Volcker Statement, supra, at 6. This focus on the borrowers' capacity to absorb
debt is misplaced, given the difficulties of country risk analysis. Regulatory policy instead
must focus on reducing the dangerous exposure of the banking system. A limit of the kind
suggested here would reduce this exposure, but would be high enough to provide the banks
extensive flexibility in the allocation of their funds.
162. See supra note 32.
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Current estimates suggest that most U.S. banks could endure an ag-
gregate loss of approximately sixty percent of capital. 63 It would be
imprudent to set the limit so high, however. The fact that loans to for-
eign countries rarely become total losses 164 should be counterbalanced
by the possibility that a substantial number of unrelated domestic and
foreign loans might fail at the same time as those in a troubled country.
Therefore, the country exposure limit should be set below sixty percent,
perhaps in the range between thirty and fifty percent of capital. 165
The country exposure limit should be implemented in phases so as to
allow banks over the country exposure limit gradually to divest their
excess loans. This would allow more heavily exposed money-center
banks time to market their excess LDC loans and would foster the or-
derly diversification of the lending pool to include banks, as well as
institutions such as pension funds and insurance companies, which
have excess country lending capacity. 66 During the phase-in period, it
163. Confidential interview with federal bank regulator (Jan. 20, 1981).
164. This is the case even over the short run. Top Banks' Third World Loans Detailed,
supra note 16, at D3, col. 1.
165. One financier has proposed a country exposure limit set between 10% and 20% of
capital. Rohatyn, supra note 25, at 7. This range approximates the current lending levels of
the 159 largest U.S. lenders taken as a whole, although it is lower than present levels of
exposure to Brazil and Mexico. It is much lower than the present exposure of the money-
center banks. See supra notes 19-20. This limit may be overly restrictive, for it would con-
strain the increased LDC lending necessary for the stability of the international financial
system. See supra text accompanying notes 48-55.
Congress currently is considering a bill authorizing the FRB to impose differing country
exposure limits on LDCs. This proposal has been opposed by bankers and regulators alike.
Proposal to Set Country Lending Limits, supra note 161, at 664-65. It would create foreign
policy difficulties and by itself would lead to a liquidity crisis that could threaten the bank-
ing system. Id The Comptroller of the Currency has stated that the imposition of country
exposure limits may be considered, Country Loan Limits May Be Put on Banks, Conover
Warns, supra note 129, at I, col. 5, but no action has been taken, Bank Regulators Agree to
Restrict Foreign Lending, Wall St. J., Apr. 8, 1983, at 4, col. 1. At least one bank supervisor
believes that the imposition of statutory exposure limits might be advisable. Confidential
interview with federal bank regulator (Sept. 24, 1982).
166. Wallich, The Future Role of the Commercial Banks, reprinted in Quota Hearings,
supra note 19, at 429-30; Wallich, American Banks Abroad in 1985, reprinted in Quota Hear-
ings, supra note 19, at 439-40; Quota Hearings, supra note 19, at 467 (testimony of Lewis
Odom).
The overexposed banks most likely would have to discount their excess positions in order
to dispose of them. This would generate some loss for those banks, but it also would serve as
an inducement to non-participating institutions to enter the market. The banks' losses
would be offset to some degree by the fee income they could generate in the syndication and
brokering of the participations. In view of the present hostility to relief for "careless lend-
ers," see House Panel Criticizes Plan to Raise LM.F. Aid, supra note 33, at D3, col. I; see also
Banks' Bidfor Aid Stirs Old, Deep Resentments, supra note 47, at Dl, col. 4, banks may well
prefer such a market divestiture to a federally imposed write-down of questionable loans.
See supra notes 89-94, 110-13 and accompanying text (mandatory loan write-down and loss
reserve provisions). A market divestiture also would be economically more efficient than
federally imposed write-downs. See Proposal to Set Country Lending Limits, supra note 161,
at 665.
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seems likely that competitive forces would compel banks which must
dispose of part of their LDC portfolios to maintain their overall LDC
exposure by making or acquiring loans to countries for which they
have not met the limit. 167 By the end of the phase-in period, the aggre-
gate exposure of the banking system to LDCs probably will have re-
mained constant, or even grown, 168 but diversification both of
individual banks' portfolios and of the lending pool will have reduced
significantly the systemic risk of that exposure. 169
The present aggregate exposure of the U.S. banking system is not
excessive. 170 By providing a limit for individual banks' exposure and
an incentive for smaller banks to participate in LDC lending, an effec-
tive country exposure limit would spread this exposure more evenly
through the system, while interfering with the lending market only as
much as is necessary to ensure safety from collapse.
B. Insurance of Country Risk in LDC Lending
In conjunction with the uniform country exposure limit, the federal
bank regulatory authorities should establish a plan for the optional in-
surance of country risk in LDC lending and require disclosure of loans
which are not insured. Country risk insurance is vital to facilitate the
diversification of lenders accomplished by the country exposure limit
and the expansion of the capital flows available for LDC lending. Be-
cause of the probability that the imposition of a country exposure limit,
without more, would lead to a reduction in overall U.S. lending to
LDCs,' 71 other affirmative measures must be implemented in order to
ensure both a supply of lenders able to assume loans divested by over-
exposed banks and a supply of capital for new loans. 172
By permitting banks to assume country risk in lending at a predict-
167. Indeed, it would not be undesirable, where possible, for banks simply to exchange
among themselves the overexposed portions of their portfolios for loans to countries whose
lending limits they have not reached.
168. This prediction assumes that some form of country risk insurance plan of the kind
suggested here would be adopted along with the exposure limit. See infra notes 171-87 and
accompanying text.
169. The present deregulation of the financial industry may have similar results. Con-
solidation of the banking industry, which probably would occur if interstate banking is al-
lowed, would produce banks with relatively larger capital bases and smaller LDC portfolios,
as the presently overexposed money-center banks merged with regional banks less deeply
engaged in LDC lending. The reduced level of LDC exposure in the larger banks probably
would offset to some degree the detrimental effect of the decreased number of lenders.
170. See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
171. More Rulesfor Banks Proposed, N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 1983, at Dl, col. 6; Proposal
to Set Country Lending Limits, supra note 161, at 664.
172. Informal government persuasion and peer pressure among banks have not been
effective in attaining these objectives, nor are they likely to be so. See IMFPlans Pressure on
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able cost, country risk insurance would encourage the entry into the
LDC market of banks which previously have considered LDC lending
too risky,' 73 and would permit banks already in the market to increase
their LDC lending activity without increasing their exposure to risk.' 74
Country risk insurance thus also would help ensure that if reductions in
lending were caused by the country exposure limit, they would be
counterbalanced by the entry of new lenders. Moreover, by spreading
the risk of default across a large pool of lenders, country risk insurance
would reduce the risk of bank insolvency arising from country default,
would minimize greatly the possibility of a cataclysmic chain of bank
failures and country defaults,' 75 and would help to increase depositor
confidence in the banking system.' 76
Insurance should be available only to cover country risk in lending
to public and private entities within LDCs; losses due to factors of nor-
mal credit risk should continue to be borne by banks and reflected in
the interest margins they demand. Insurance would be available for
any or all of a bank's LDC loans, and claims would be honored for full
or partial nonpayment of either interest or principal.
Premiums should be assessed at a uniform rate on the principal of
the loans insured. 177 A uniform rate is appropriate because of the diffi-
culty of evaluating country risk and the need to insulate the credit allo-
cation process from political interference. 178 In this way the plan is
Banks to He/p Brazil, supra note 21, at Dl, col. 1; Fed Push on Foreign Loans Seen, supra
note 49, at 29, col. 6. They are undesirable by comparison to a comprehensive solution.
173. For the most part, these are the regional banks and non-bank institutions which do
not have sufficient access to LDC country information to lend confidently. See supra text
accompanying note 28. Regional banks may be able to obtain better data through informa-
tion-sharing consortia. See Banks Plan Effort for Poor Lands, N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1982, at
D3, col. 1; Worldwide Debt Data for Banks, N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1983, at D1, col. 6. The
mere access to such information is unlikely to generate sufficient participation by the re-
gional banks, given their lack of experience and commitment to LDC lending. See supra
note 28 and accompanying text.
174. Of course, these banks could expand their lending in individual countries only up
to the country exposure limits described above. See supra text accompanying notes 160-70.
175. In order to protect more fully against the risk of concurrent LDC defaults, insur-
ance could be made mandatory for an individual bank's aggregate LDC exposure in excess
of a fixed percentage of bank capital in the range of 100% to 200%.
176. The maintenance of depositor confidence in banks is as important as the reassur-
ance of hesitant regional banks, for it is necessary that banks which lend to LDCs have
access to sufficient funds to continue present levels of lending. See G. JOHNSON, supra note
17, at 34. The development of depositor confidence was the primary goal in the establish-
ment of the FDIC. See Scott & Mayer, Risk and Regulation in Banking: Some Proposalsfor
Federal Deposit Insurance Reform, 23 STAN. L. REv. 857, 858-60 (1971).
177. The insurance of rescheduled loans would be at a higher premium. See infra note
181.
178. No Time/or Rancor Against the Banks, supra note 6, at A26, col. 1; Proposal to Set
Country Lending Limits, supra note 161, at 665. Arguments supporting a uniform premium
rate are analogous to those made in favor of a uniform country lending limit. See supra note
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modeled after the FDIC, which is backed by the U.S. government and
funded at a uniform rate by the insuror banks.179
Country risk insurance should protect banks-and the banking sys-
tem--only from system-threatening failures caused by non-performing
LDC loans-not from the risk of loss that accompanies all lending.
While providing effective insulation from bank failures arising out of
country risk, the insurance system nonetheless should impose on indi-
vidual banks the costs of imprudent or negligent lending practices.
Therefore, only a fixed percentage of each loan would be insurable and
losses would not be recoverable until loan payments had been inter-
rupted for a number of months. These provisions not only would en-
courage prudent lending, but also would give lenders an incentive to
reschedule or refinance the debt of fundamentally creditworthy bor-
rowers.180 Losses which occur within one year of the making of the
loan also would not be recoverable, so as to require banks to bear lend-
ing risks which they should be able to assess adequately.18 1 To protect
against the related possibility of the insurance of loans which have be-
come problematic, banks would be permitted to insure loans only at the
time of their making. Finally, in order to discourage LDC defaults, the
U.S. government would be subrogated to banks' rights of collection
against a defaulting LDC.
Insurance should not be mandatory; banks should be permitted to
self-insure, but should they do so, they also should be required to dis-
close their risk-taking to their shareholders and the banking public. 8 2
161 and accompanying text. It might be possible to differentiate premiums on the basis of a
very limited number of broad country risk categories, such as those currently used by the
Interagency Committee. See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text. An attempt to cre-
ate a refined set of categories, however, would invite precisely the same difficulties involved
in the assessment of country risk. See supra notes 95-99 and accompanying text.
179. See Scott & Mayer, supra note 176, at 866-74.
180. Some administrative determination of the actual interruption of payments would be
necessary, but this could be minimized if the burden of proof were placed on the claimant.
181. A lower percentage of coverage at a higher rate might be available during this pe-
riod so that banks could choose more fully to insulate themselves from risk.
A related problem exists as to the insurance of rescheduled or "rolled-over" loans. It
would be important in the implementation of the insurance plan not to discourage loan
rescheduling, which plays an essential role in the maintenance of international capital flows.
Because rescheduled loans probably are most vulnerable to the continued threat of payment
interruption, the demand to insure them probably would be high. Application of the one-
year holding period for new loans to rescheduled ones might overly impede rescheduling.
Instead, insurance should be available for rescheduled loans, but at a higher premium rate
reflecting their greater risk. This higher premium reflects the operation of the market, for
banks currently are able to obtain increased interest margins and fees on rescheduled loans.
Bank Regulators Agree to Restrict Foreign Lending, supra note 165, at 4, col. 2.
182. The money-center banks are likely to oppose any insurance scheme as superfluous
and costly, and as overly favorable to smaller banks--the same arguments they made in
opposition to the establishment of the FDIC. These banks would be permitted to attempt to
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Banks would face no disclosure requirements as to insured loans.1 3
Disclosure of non-insurance of LDC loans should be required because
non-insurance would represent an exposure to risk which would be im-
portant to large depositors and material to bank stockholders. 8 4 Banks
would disclose their uninsured loan exposure to each foreign country,
together with that created by loans to branches and subsidiaries of each
country's banks, and would explain the potential impact of that expo-
sure on earnings and solvency.
In this connection, the FRB affirmatively would declare that it would
not act as lender of last resort for banks jeopardized by uninsured LDC
loans. Such a clarification of the FRB's role would add to market sta-
bility without discouraging responsible behavior on the part of
banks.185 Uninsured LDC loans would be subject to loss reserve and
loan write-off requirements similar to those currently in place, 86 but
imposed more flexibly and over longer periods in order to prevent
destabilization of the system. Bank regulators would have the power to
mandate loss reserve accumulation and loan write-offs both before the
economize by comparison to the insurance pool, but would be required to disclose the mag-
nitude and country recipient of uninsured loans.
183. Banks probably need not be required to disclose uninsured amounts within the
insurance plan, Le., the percentage of each loan which cannot be covered, see supra text
accompanying note 180, and loans within the one-year holding period, see supra text accom-
panying note 181. Uninsured amounts probably would be so small by comparison to the
amounts within the plan that disclosure would be unwarranted; the country exposure limit
should ensure safety. An alternative approach might require the aggregated disclosure of
uninsured amounts.
184. Disclosure would promote prudence on the part of the banks by exposing their
uninsured LDC lending to the scrutiny of their stockholders, uninsured large depositors, and
even small insured depositors who might withdraw their funds from banks engaged in such
lending at excessive levels of risk. The potential pressure from disclosure would likely pro-
vide an incentive to achieve safety through participation in the insurance plan.
Banks and bank regulators traditionally have considered disclosure of loan information to
be anathema. Disclosure heretofore has been resisted on three grounds: first, it is unneces-
sary to protect small depositors, who are insured under the FDIC; second, confidentiality is
essential to the conduct of lending; and third, bank shareholders and large depositors in any
event are offered significant protection by the examination process and other federal bank
regulations. The plan recommended here would not force the banks to disclose individual
loans, credit risk assessments, or other information that should be confidential. The exist-
ence of the present crisis suggests that it would be unwise to continue to rely on the present
regulatory framework to ensure safety.
185. Banks have sought clarification of the FRB's role as a lender of last resort. Grant,
supra note 29, at 39. Congressional sentiment seems to require that the banks submit to
greater regulation if they are to receive assurances of support from the central banks. See
Challengefor Central Banks, supra note 29, at D13, col. 2. In order to ensure maximum
confidence on the part of depositors, it is important that the FRB's policy on assistance of
last resort be clear and explicit. See id This also would alleviate smaller banks' uncertainty
over whether they would be included in a federal bank rescue if collapse were to occur. See
G. JOHNSON, supra note 17, at 34.
186. See supra text accompanying notes 89-94.
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occurrence of payment interruptions and at the time of reschedul-
ings. 187 These provisions, in conjunction with relatively strict disclo-
sure requirements, probably would provide strong incentives for loan
insurance.
The most significant near-term risk to the international financial sys-
tem is the possibility of a contraction of the flow of capital to LDCs.
Such a lending contraction would impair further both their economic
development and their ability to service their loans and thus would
jeopardize their bank creditors. The country risk insurance system pro-
posed here would encourage smaller lenders to re-enter the LDC lend-
ing market and would allow some banks to increase their LDC lending
without exposing themselves to greater country risk. The system thus
would diversify and enlarge the pool of capital available for LDC
lending.
C. The Case for Fundamental Reform
The system of country exposure limits and country risk insurance
proposed here has several advantages by comparison to the present reg-
ulatory framework. 8 8 Most important, the proposed plan would re-
duce significantly the risk of financial calamity currently posed by bank
overexposure and the reduction of capital flows to LDCs. Country
lending limits would diversify the loan portfolios of the banks which
lend to LDCs and enlarge the pool of lenders in the LDC capital mar-
187. The regulatory supervision of these loans would not be particularly costly, for it is
likely that only an uninsured default by a large LDC borrower would require such gradual
write-offs.
188. A number of other banking reform proposals have been made. In response to Con-
gressional criticism, the three federal bank regulatory bodies have suggested improving the
present supervisory system by strenthening the examination process and write-off provisions,
adding new disclosure requirements, and changing accounting rules which tend to exagger-
ate short-term profits reported in LDC lending. See Volcker Statement, supra note 161, at 6-
7; Bank Regulators Agree to Restrict Foreign Lending, supra note 165, at 4, col. 2. These
incremental measures do not represent a departure from the current approach and are sub-
ject to its flaws. See supra notes 69-159 and accompanying text. They seem unlikely to
promote the goals of domestic safety, international stability, and diversification.
Another proposal advocates requiring maintenance of non-interest-bearing reserves
amounting to a fixed percentage of international loans outstanding in order to increase inter-
est rates and thus reduce borrowing. House Panel Criticizes Plan to Raise ZM.F. Aid, supra
note 33, at Dl, col. 1, D3, col. 1. Because it only safeguards existing loans and contains no
incentives for diversification and continued lending, this proposal would cause a sharp re-
striction in the international flow of capital, with its attendant dangers. See supra text ac-
companying notes 27-35.
It has also been proposed that the government provide banks capital in exchange for
preferred stock or the assumption of troubled loans below market value. Rohatyn, supra
note 25, at 6. This proposal would impose a heavy burden on the taxpayers and lead to
excessive government involvement in the private capital market, which could impede future
LDC lending.
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ket, while a government-operated insurance plan would help to reverse
the contraction in available capital caused by the reduced participation
of the regional banks in LDC lending. The availability of country risk
insurance for LDC loans would reduce much of the regional banks'
uncertainty about LDC lending, while the divestiture at discount of
money-center banks' LDC loans over the country exposure limit would
provide a profitable opportunity for them to return to the market.
Once regional banks again participate in LDC lending, the existence of
country risk insurance would encourage them not to restrict their lend-
ing at first signs of payment difficulty.
Many negative aspects of the present regulatory structure would be
eliminated by the proposed plan, and some of its components would be
made more effective. The regulatory system proposed would eliminate
reliance on country risk assessment to regulate LDC exposure. Most of
the present examination and enforcement procedures for LDC lending
would be replaced by the more easily administered lending limit and
insurance and disclosure system. Although data collection and risk as-
sessment would continue to be useful functions of both the banking
authorities and the banks' internal credit evaluation processes, the ad-
ministration of lending limits would not require the close analysis of
bank risk profiles which has been demanded by the present comment
system. Close analysis of banks' internal risk assessment procedures
also would be made unnecessary. The regulatory burden imposed by
the current program of disclosure would be eliminated for all banks
except those which choose to self-insure.
The plan also has the benefit of limiting the role of the U.S. govern-
ment in the allocation -of private capital to LDCs, while permitting the
maintenance of the significant bank financing of LDCs which is in the
U.S. interest. Government policy should and does abjure regulatory
involvement in the credit allocation process; 89 political action on the
government's part should not be permitted to interfere with the interna-
tional flow of private capital. 90 The proposed plan also would allevi-
ate the compromise of U.S. monetary policy caused by the indirect
prevention of LDC default through lower interest rates.' 9 '
This plan provides an equitable distribution of its costs among
LDCs, banks, and the U.S. government. Although overexposed banks
189. Pressure on Bank Regulators, supra note 17, at D1, col. 3, D3, col. 3; No Timefor
Rancor Against the Banks, supra note 6, at A26, col. 2.
190. Although there always would remain the possibility of government intervention on
grounds of national security, as in the U.S. interventions during the Iranian crisis.
191. See supra text accompanying notes 152-59.
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would incur losses as they disposed of their excess LDC loans, it is not
unfair that they suffer reduced earnings as part of the price of restruc-
turing the massive debt they accumulated, for high interest rates have
compensated them for the risk of some losses. The cost of the debt
restructuring and country risk insurance would be passed on to the
LDCs in the form of higher interest margins, 92 which, unfortunately,
would further slow their development. 93 At the same time, it does not
seem unreasonable that the U.S. government provide a level of institu-
tional support for a scheme which will help perpetuate the "public"
role of the banks, 194 especially since the governments of the developed
countries largely have abdicated their traditional role as financiers of
LDC deficits and have endorsed its assumption by the commercial
banks. 95 These costs certainly are far less than those all parties would
bear in the event of a financial collapse.
V. Conclusion
The U.S. and global financial systems are threatened gravely by
present levels and concentrations of commercial bank lending to LDCs.
While the concentration of LDC loans among the largest U.S. banks
endangers the stability of the U.S. banking system, any reduction in the
flow of bank lending to LDCs could precipitate financial catastrophe or
prolonged depression. U.S. policymakers therefore must balance two
superficially contending objectives, which in fact are mutually reinforc-
ing: the maintenance of the safety of the domestic banking system,
which is promoted by the reduction of bank overexposure to LDCs,
and the stability of the international financial system, which must be
bolstered by increasing the level of capital flows to LDCs. The com-
bined diversification of the pool of U.S. institutions involved in LDC
192. It seems likely that the actual rates charged LDC borrowers would not change
greatly, for the cost of the insurance premium which would be passed through to them
would be substituted for the risk component of the interest rates they currently pay. It is
possible, however, that the poorer LDCs would enjoy slightly lower effective interest rates,
which would be compensated by higher rates for wealthier ones, for the insurance scheme
would tend to pool the risk premiums which the market would demand of them.
193. This unfortunate result is far preferable to the effects on LDCs' rconomies of the
systemic shock or prolonged economic stagnation that would accompany a significant con-
traction in LDC lending.
194. Many feel that the role of the commercial banks in LDC lending can continue to be
constructive. See, e.g., Wallich, The Future Role of Ihe Commercial Banks, supra note 67, at
429. Furthermore, the economic vigor of the LDCs continues to be of great importance to
economic conditions in the developed countries. See supra notes 48-55 and accompanying
text.
195. Lever, supra note 33, at A27, col. 2.
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lending and of the loan portfolios of those institutions already heavily
involved will harmonize and achieve these objectives.
Current U.S. regulation of commercial bank lending to LDCs is not
promoting this diversification. The regulatory system is comprised of a
group of uncoordinated and disparate elements including ineffective
bank examination and statutory lending limits, disclosure requirements
which are simultaneously counterproductive and incomplete, and the
uncertain role of the Federal Reserve Board as a lender of last resort.
Furthermore, much of the system is permeated by faulty assumptions
about the usefulness of country risk analysis. The ineffectiveness of the
regulatory system continues to exacerbate the domestic and interna-
tional crisis, in spite of some regulators' recognition that diversification
is essential to the achievement of systemic stability.
Most of the current reform proposals either fail to escape the flaws of
the present system or promise to reduce the flow of capital to LDCs to a
level that will invite disaster. The reforms proposed by this Article-
enactment of a uniform country exposure limit in conjunction with a
plan offering banks a choice between insurance of their country risk
exposure or disclosure of their LDC lending-will enhance portfolio
and lender diversification without limiting capital flows to LDCs. Its
costs will be shared efficiently among banks and governments without
hampering market independence, injecting political considerations into
capital allocation, or constraining the policy judgments of the LDCs.
The dangers posed by the perpetuation of the present situation compel
consideration of fundamental regulatory reforms of the kind proposed
here.
